Abstract-Energy resilience has emerged as a national security priority over the past fifteen years. Recent research efforts have aimed to develop metrics and analysis methods for energy resilience, but most of those efforts have focused on extreme weather and other natural hazards as the threat of interest. This paper introduces a novel set of resilience metrics and exemplifies how they can be applied to analyze resilience for growing concerns about cyber threats. The metrics are formally described with mathematical equations and demonstrated in a case study that evaluates the resilience benefits of a new moving target defense technology.
quency Indice (SAIFI) have long been the standard metrics for evaluating grid operations, but these metrics are specifically designed to exclude the effects that hurricanes, earthquakes, and other low probability, high consequence disruptions have on grid operations and the ability to deliver power.
Resilience research efforts attempt to address that gap. The vast majority of energy resilience research has focused on natural disasters, but recent cyber attacks on power systems, such as those that occurred in 2015 and 2016 in Ukraine [2] , [3] , are highlighting the need for cyber resilience metrics and analysis methods that address cyber threats.
This paper proposes a set of cyber resilience metrics for analyzing power systems and other industrial control systems (ICSs). We describe how these performance-based metrics, originally developed by Vugrin et al. for physical infrastructure systems and threats [4] , can be used to analyze and measure resilience of these systems to selected cyber threats. Section II describes previous work related to cyber resilience metrics and defines Vugrin et al.'s metrics with a series of mathematical equations. Section III applies the metrics to demonstrate their usage and to evaluate the resilience benefits of Artificial Diversity and Defense Security (ADDSec), a recently developed moving target defense (MTD) technology. Sections IV and V present analysis results and summarize findings, respectively.
II. RELATED CYBER RESILIENCE METRIC
EFFORTS Resilience has been analyzed as a property of complex systems for more than 40 years [5] , but it has only emerged as a national security priority 978-1-5090-6684-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE2 in the past 15 years. During that period, several resilience metrics have been proposed for infrastructure systems in general (e.g., [6] , [7] ) and for power systems (e.g., [8] , [9] ). Some of the more recently proposed metrics have been developed specifically for cyber threats. Many of these metrics are qualitative and rely heavily on subject matter expert (SME) judgment (e.g., [10] , [11] , [12] ). An alternative class of metrics uses system performance measures to quantify resilience of systems to specified classes of cyber attacks. These approaches frequently use modeling and simulation to represent system operations; describe how an attack affects devices, networks, and individuals; and estimate the impact of cyber attacks on system outputs. System outputs are generally combined through a series of mathematical calculations to produce a number (or set of numbers) that represents the system's ability to continue providing outputs throughout the attack. For example, Reiger uses a "disturbance and impact resilience evaluation curve" to describe how a cyber attack affects operation of control systems, and features of that curve (e.g., slope) define a set of resilience metrics [13] . Clark and Zonouz use a game-theoretic formulation to define cyber resilience metrics [14] .
Vugrin et al. used a control theoretic approach to create a set of performance-based resilience metrics for analysis of infrastructure systems [4] . Systemic Impact (SI), defined in (1), represents the cumulative ability of the system to mitigate the attack and continue operating through adverse conditions. SI sums the difference between targeted system performance (T SP ) levels and actual system performance (SP ) levels over the time period from which the disturbance d commences (t 0 ) until response activities conclude (t f ). The j index denotes that multiple system performance measures may be considered, and the q j parameters weight the relative importance of the measures. Total Recovery Effort (T RE) defined in (2), represents the cumulative effort required for the response measures, the incremental recovery effort (RE), to overcome the disturbance and recover the system. The k index denotes that multiple response measures may be employed, and the r k parameters weight the relative costs of each response. T RE can be thought of as the total cost of employing response measures. The Resilience Index (R), defined in (3), is a linear combination SI and T RE and represents the overall impact of a disturbance to the system. Smaller R values indicate higher levels of resilience to the specified attacks. The α parameter weights the importance of SI relative to T RE. The quantity N is a normalizing term that enables comparison of systems of different sizes.
where
These metrics have been used to analyze various infrastructure (e.g., power grid, hospitals, etc.) and several threat types (e.g., flooding, hurricanes, supply chain disruptions). Analyses have used these metrics to identify threats of greatest concern; rank system designs and response strategies according to which ones provide the greatest resilience benefit; and perform cost-benefit analyses to determine how to maximize resilience on a constrained budget.
The control theoretic foundations of these metrics align well with power grid systems and other ICSs. The SI quantity measures how well the system is operating through the disruption, and the T RE quantity measures the overall cost of operating. Finding a suitable balance between the two quantities is a common control systems goal and has been mathematically defined in the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) and other optimal control formulations.
Previous analyses with these metrics have focused on physical threats, but the disruption variable d in Eqns. (1) - (3) does not have to represent a physical threat. To perform a cyber resilience analysis, d can represent a cyber vector, and the SI, T RE, and R quantities can measure how effectively the cyber threat achieves its goals. The following section exemplifies how the metrics can be used for a cyber resilience analysis.
III. CASE STUDY
To demonstrate how the aforementioned metrics can be used to analyze resilience impacts, we apply the metrics to evaluate the ADDSec MTD technology. Specifically, we consider a microgrid scenario. Microgrids are cyber-physical systems that include distributed energy resources (DER), distributed controllers, sensors, protection equipment, etc. Smart devices, advanced communications, and complex algorithms/schemes encompass the cyber-side of microgrids. Due to increasing cyber attacks and the traditional lack of security in grid systems, it is important to secure the cyber components described.
For this case study, we focus on the reconnaissance phase of a cyber attack where the adversary attempts to gain information about the system topology, network map with specific IP addresses, and other data to formulate a targeted cyber attack. We model a scenario in which an adversary deploys a worm that seeks to discover and propagate through devices in a microgrid wide-area network composed of various machines, routers, and other devices to gain information. Note, only the wide-area network, not the power system, is simulated. Further details on ADDSec, the worm, and the experimental setup are provided in the following sections. We use the resilience metrics to assess if ADDSec can provide resilience benefits to a system by effectively defending against reconnaissance activities. Specifically, we use the performance-based cyber resilience metrics to answer the following questions:
• Q1: Does deployment of ADDSec provide a measurable resilience benefit against the specified reconnaissance attack? • Q2: Does deployment of ADDSec impose a significant negative burden (i.e., large TRE) on the system? An external adversary that wishes to attack an ICS must first perform reconnaissance on the network to gain the information required to carry out their objectives, including host and networking configurations, applications, and process data. Even after an attacker has gained initial access to the system, the intruder may need to pivot to other devices on the network and establish permanent access to the system to issue commands or exfiltrate data. If system parameters change during one of these phases, the adversary must develop more sophisticated techniques and dedicate additional resources to successfully carry out their attack. Chavez et al. developed ADDSec as a tool to improve system resilience through MTD. ADDSec integrates several components:
1) Dynamic reconfiguration of networking and routing parameters, using pseudo-random number generators as a source of entropy, including randomization of IP addresses and ports, to thwart reconnaissance and prevent unwanted connections. 2) Generation of unique application binaries within a system to raise the difficulty of producing software exploits. 3) An ensemble of machine learning algorithms that analyze host statistics, networking information, and network traffic to autonomously detect and trigger reconfiguration of the systems in real-time. An ICS that has been integrated with ADDSec can leverage these capabilities to provide a barrier against many Ethernet-based attacks. Intuitively, use of dynamic configurations and decreased predictability for attackers seems reasonable as a means for enhancing cyber resilience, but techniques to evaluate the resilience benefits of MTDs to-date has been primarily survey-and opinionbased [16] . This paper will provide and demonstrate a quantitative approach for assessing MTD.
For more information on how ADDSec operates (such as its use of software defined networking (SDN) to enable transperancy to end-devices), please refer to [15] .
B. Experimental Setup 1) Test Network:
A virtualized environment was developed using the minimega Emulytics TM platform to model the behavior of an ICS network with twenty representative microgrid network devices [17] . The system is segmented into two subnets connected by a router, with ten devices in each subnet. A poller situated on one of the subnets periodically sends a connection request to each of the twenty devices to maintain the system routing paths and provide basic monitoring. The network is illustrated in Fig. 1 . An SDN controller maintains a map of the devices and connections in the network and issues randomized IP addresses for each device, either generated at periodic intervals or when an alert has been received by the controller. Machine learning algorithms running on each device periodically collect baseline statistics on host performance, monitor network connections, and perform deep packet inspection on network traffic to build a model of normal operations. Every 5 seconds, the machine learning scripts collect this data to be checked against the model and send a signal to the controller if anomalous behavior is detected. To obtain analysis data, packet captures were collected at each endpoint and router represented in Fig. 1 .
2) Worm Design: To model a scanning-based attack on the system, a worm was programmed to launch from a single attacker device on the system. The worm first attempts to discover the subnets the device is connected to using native system calls, then scans each of those subnets using ICMP requests to map out active host addresses. When an ICMP reply is received and another host is discovered, the worm attempts to open a secure TCP connection to the target host by passing the current authentication credentials from the current host or guessing the target host credentials. Once a connection has been successfully established, the worm attempts to self-replicate on the target host. As the worm propagates through the devices in the system, it generates increasing quantities of extraneous network traffic, potentially impacting system availability. Henceforth, the worm designed for this particular attack scenario will be referred to as the ScanWorm.
3) Assumptions: The attack scenario is intended to primarily model the behavior of the earlier phases of a multi-staged cyber attack on a microgrid network. Although attacks on modern networks have become more sophisticated than a typical worm, they still commonly employ worm-like behaviors to automatically map out and infect or pivot to adjacent systems on the network. We assume in our attack scenario that the threat actor has already breached a single device in the network through an external entry vector such as social engineering or phishing, but only has access to user space functionality. We also assume that the system has not been set up with specific security controls to thwart our attack internally, such as multifactor authentication, as they are not common to trusted microgrid networks. For example, although ICMP requests may be filtered by a network firewall, they are rarely blocked outright as they are used for traffic redirection and status pings. While we do not use evasion techniques to mask the activity of ScanWorm from typical malware detection systems or attempt to install a backdoor on the infected system, we can assume that a typical attacker will carry out these additional steps.
The randomization of IP addresses can serve to thwart an adversary during multiple stages of their attack. Although the worm may initiate connection attempts at a sub-microsecond level, ICMP requests are rate-limited by the devices in our experiment to 1 request per second as a standard protection against denial of service (DoS) attacks. This also prevents an adversary from exhaustively scanning every address in a subnet before the next randomization event occurs, preventing devices from being discovered during reconnaissance. Moreover, standard traffic sniffers will reveal multiple addresses for each device and overlapping addresses within each subnet. If the device has already been discovered, the attacker may not be able to establish a connection with the target or deliver their payload before the networking parameters are changed. Unless the attacker has already established a presence on the system, they will have to adapt to the dynamic environment and carry out their tasks covertly to avoid detection.
C. Resilience Metric Calculations
For this analysis, SI measures the fraction of network hosts infected by ScanWorm and the rate at which ScanWorm infects the hosts. SI is defined by (1) where:
• SP 1 (t) = the fraction of network hosts NOT infected at time t.
• T SP 1 (t) = 1, i.e., the goal is to prevent all hosts from getting infected.
• q 1 = 1 because we only have a single system performance measure for SI.
• The period of analysis goes from 0 to 1000 seconds, i.e., t0 = 0 and tf = 1000. Specification of SI in this manner is similar to security metrics that use % of hosts infected to quantify confidentiality or integrity [18] . Our definition of SI adds a time element because speed of attack and response are frequent considerations for resilience analyses. If ADDSec can sufficiently slow the progress of ScanWorm, the network's intrusion detection system or other defensive measures may detect the attack and deploy countermeasures before the worm progresses too far. The use of ADDSec could have negative effects on the network that can be viewed as the "cost" of implementation. To quantify these costs, we define the T RE metric with (2) where
where ART is the average round trip time for a packet to be acknowledged and ART B represents the average round trip time when ADDSec is not in use but the ScanWorm is present. Thus, RE 1 provides a measure of additional network latency that occurs because ADDSec is present (not due to ScanWorm), relative to baseline levels.
where F D is the fraction of sent packets that are dropped, and F D B is that same quantity for the baseline scenario.
• RE 3 = F T −F T B where F T is the fraction of sent packets that are retransmitted, and F T B is that same quantity for the baseline scenario.
• r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 are set to 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2, respectively. Assigning weights in this manner signifies that increases in latency are of highest concern, then dropped packets, then retransmitted packets. Specification of T RE in this manner can help one understand the tradeoffs between slowing ScanWorm's progress and the potential negative effects of ADDSec on network operations. Additionally, α = 1 and N = 1000. Table I lists the network statistics when ADDSec is not implemented, and when ScanWorm is and is not present. Without ADDSec, the worm is able to infect all of the 20 hosts. Total travel time increases with the presence of the worm, but that increase is primarily due to an increased number of packets being sent. The number of retransmitted packets is similar in each case (slightly higher without We examine the impacts that ADDSec has on the network's resilience for 9 different test cases (Table II) . In the first 8 cases, ADDSec randomizes the IP addresses at a constant rate (Constant Mode), varying from once every second (case T1) to once every 256 seconds (case T8). In the last case (T9), ADDSec only randomizes the IP address when the machine learning algorithms detect anomalous network activity, thus ML Trigger Mode. For each case, 10 trials were performed to account for stochastic variability. Results for each case are averaged across 10 trials. Tables III and IV show the network statistics and resilience calculations, respectively, for each test case. The plots shown in Fig. 2(a)-(c) summarize the average resilience calculation results for each test case. Fig. 2(d) illustrates the time progression of host infections for case T5 and the case where ADDSec is not implemented. When ADDSec is not implemented, all hosts are infected within 600 seconds; for case T5, when ADDSec is deployed, only 5 hosts are infected and the first host is infected after nearly 700 seconds. Hence, ADDSec appears to both slow the rate of infection and the total number of hosts that get infected. Using the resilience calculations, we can address the previously posed questions Q1-Q4:
IV. RESULTS
Q1: During an attack scenario when the ScanWorm is present in the target system, ADDSec provides a measurable resilience benefit, with the results dependent upon the randomization rate. Using hypothesis testing for equality of means, we found R for case T1 was significantly lower than the R values of cases with slower randomization rates at the 5% level of significance. As expected, ADDSec limits the number of hosts that become infected within 1000 seconds compared to the baseline system operating without ADDSec. Higher rates of IP randomization (e.g., 1 second) lead to lower rates of infection and lower SI, as the worm is not able to scan through the full range of potential IP addresses before a reconfiguration occurs. Because the worm is then forced to continually rescan the addresses in the first subnet, it is not able to effectively scan the addresses in the second subnet. With higher rates of IP randomization, the number of erroneous retrans -T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9 Test Cases T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8 missions increases, but this is offset by a decrease in retransmission of packets sent by the ScanWorm. The number of dropped packets does not appear to be affected by the operation of ADDSec. Q2: ADDSec does not impose a significant negative burden on the network. ADDSec has limited effect on round trip time and packet retransmits, and no effect on dropped packets. As evidenced by the T RE values in Table IV , there is a marginal overhead.
Q3: The results indicate that the detection algorithms employed by ADDSec were effective, though the Constant Mode of operation with the highest rate of randomization slightly outperformed the ML Trigger Mode. The higher system resources required to tune and process the machine learning algorithms in Trigger Mode increased T RE, but did not decrease SI to the same extent as Constant Mode. This result is not obvious from qualitative evaluation, and provides valuable insight into the relative effectiveness of different modes of operation in ADDSec. As discussed earlier, the overhead for executing the randomization process is minimal, so false positives are not of concern. However, note that the triggers are dependent upon the accuracy of the machine learning models and algorithms to minimize false negatives.
Q4: As revealed through the preceding discussion, ADDSec provides significant resilience benefits to the target system under the modeled reconnaissance attack. ADDSec is effective in thwarting the ScanWorm, increasing the effort required for the adversary to execute the reconnaissance phase of the attack. Moreover, the resilience metrics presented in this paper allow us to demonstrate the effectiveness of ADDSec quantitatively. R decreases with higher rates of IP randomization, demonstrating that ADDSec is effective at increasing system resilience in our case study. Intuitively, we can observe that the number of infections trends downward when ADDSec randomization rates are increased. However, using this framework allows us to elucidate insights beyond what may be gleaned intuitively, and may be used to understand the incremental benefit of changing parameters such as randomization rate. For example, randomizing IP addresses at 8, 16, and 32 seconds has similar success preventing host infections and similar R values. However, consideration of system resources must be taken to determine a suitable "fast" setting for ADDSec. Although many smart devices and programmable components in modern microgrids should have the capacity for a fast randomization rate, a slower rate may be optimal for an older embedded system without adequate resources.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a set of metrics for quantifying resilience against cyber attacks. Application of the metrics in the presented case study demonstrates how the metrics can be used to evaluate the benefits of resilience technologies, such as MTD, and how the technologies can be best deployed to maximize benefits. In future work, we will explore more realistic applications where the metrics will be used to evaluate the performance of multiple technologies against a suite of potential attacks.
